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The Scope of the Power to Impeach
In the intense controversies of last year concerning the impeachment
of former President Nixon, the prevailing view was that the Consti-
tution limits impeachable offenses to treason, bribery, or other "high
crimes and misdemeanors."' This Note contends that the prevailing
view comports neither with the text of the Constitution nor with much
of the history relevant to an understanding of impeachment, and fails
to protect the public against much serious misconduct by government
officials, including the President. The Note will argue (1) that im-
peachable offenses are not defined in the Constitution, (2) that "high
1. That proposition is the starting point of Raoul Berger's thorough exegesis of im-
peachment, which appeared in late 1973. Berger concludes that "high crimes and mis-
demeanors," and therefore impeachable offenses, amount to serious misconduct, but are
not limited to statutory crimes. R. BERGER, IMPEACHMIENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEIS
53-102 (1973) (esp. 91-93) [hereinafter cited as BERCER]. Views of impeachment akin to
that of Berger can be traced at least as far back as Joseph Story. See I J. STORY, Co-
MENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 789-98, at 575-83 (5th ed. 1891).
Another recent commentator focusses more specifically than Berger on American federal
impeachments, and concludes that "high crimes and misdemeanors" consist only of crimes
indictable under federal law and violations of oaths of office. I. BRANT, IMPEACHMENT
23 (1972) [hereinafter cited as BRANT]. Another commentator concludes that "high crimes
and misdemeanors" should be limited to misconduct, not necessarily criminal, which
threatens the structure of government itself. C. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 36-41
(1974) [hereinafter cited as BLACK]. The common starting point of these commentators
was so little challenged that, almost by default, the words "high crimes and misde-
meanors" have come to be virtually synonymous with "impeachable offenses." The staff
of the House Judiciary Committee took a position very close to that of Berger. See
IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY STAFF OF HOUSE COIM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CoNG., 2D SEsS.,
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 1, 4 (Comm. Print 1974). The
President's lawyers took a position very near that of Brant. See St. Clair, An Analysis
of the Constitutional Standard for Impeachment, in PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT: A Docu-
MENTARY OvERviEW 40-73 (M. Schnapper ed. 1974). Nearly all of the many others who
wrote or spoke on the subject of impeachment-while disagreeing among themselves
over what constitutes a high crime or misdemeanor-agreed that the Constitution re-
quires a high crime or misdemeanor as the basis of an impeachment. See, e.g., Fenton,
The Scope of the Impeachment Power, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 719, 720 (1970); Panel on
Impeachment, YALE L. REP., Winter 1974, at 25-27 (remarks of Pollak & Summers). An
extensive listing of available sources on impeachment-with capsule summaries of their
leading contentions-may be found in the House Judiciary Committee print, supra,
reprinted in BLACK, supra, at 71-76. The proceedings against President Nixon did not
culminate in a final adjudication, and therefore constitute less than a perfect precedent
for any given theory of impeachment. But most of the decisions and recorded statements
relating to those proceedings rested on the assumption that "high crimes and misde-
meanors" exhaust the list of impeachable offenses. See Hearings on H. Res. 803 Before
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (esp. at 2) (entitled "De-
bate on Articles of Impeachment") [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Nixon Articles].
But see 120 CONG. REC. H3833 (daily ed. May 14, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Reuss). What
follows here is an attempt to challenge that assumption, lest the passage of time confer
insuperable authority on the currently prevailing view.
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crimes and misdemeanors" are an historically well-defined category
of offenses aimed specifically against the state, for which removal is
mandatory upon conviction by the Senate, (3) that Congress has the
power to impeach and remove civil officers for a wide range of serious
offenses other than high crimes and misdemeanors, and (4) that the
Senate can impose sanctions less severe than removal from office on
civil officers convicted of such other offenses.
I. The Text of the Constitution
A. The Meaning of Article II, § 4
The prevailing view of impeachment rests on Article II, § 4, of
the Constitution:
The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United
States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Mis-
demeanors.
Recent commentators have generally found in this clause the entire
scope of the impeachment power.2 But a careful reading of the lan-
guage indicates that it is neither a definition of the impeachment
power nor an exhaustive listing of impeachable offenses.
First, on their face, the words of Article II, § 4, do not purport to
be a definition. They require the removal of civil officers convicted
in impeachment proceedings of "treason, bribery, or other high crimes
and misdemeanors." "Shall be removed" has the form of a command,
not of a definition. 3
Second, the language of Article II, § 4, does not indicate that it is
2. See sources cited in note 1 supra.
3. "Shall" has imperative force everywhere in the Constitution when it occurs in an
independent clause. Every command in the Constitution is couched in terms of "shall."
See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328-33 (1816). There were
exchanges at the Federal Convention confirming that the Framers attached imperative
force to "shall." See 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 377, 412-13 (rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND].
In a chancery case of 1744 the question of the imperative force of "shall" arose in a
context closely analogous to the one considered here. In the constitution of a trust, the
trustees and survivors were given a general power to remove "the chaplain, treasurer,
and other officers and merchants" from a College. There was an additional clause as-
serting that "if they find any merchant immoral, guilty of drunkenness, they shall and
may remove them" (emphasis added). The Chancellor concluded that "the latter clause
is not a restraining clause, or gives them less power, but only lays an injunction or ob-
ligation upon them to remove for such general offenses, and leaves them in every in-
stance besides to act at their discretion . . . . The words shall and may in general acts
of parliament, or in private constitutions, are to be construed imperatively, they must
remove them." Attorney General v. Lock, 26 Eng. Rep. 897, 898 (Ch. 1744).
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an exhaustive listing of impeachable offenses. That civil officers must
be removed for "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misde-
meanors," does not preclude the existence of other misconduct for
which they may be impeached and removed. For Article II, § 4, to
be an exhaustive listing, "shall be removed for" must be taken as
somehow equivalent to "shall be removed only for." But when the
drafters of the Constitution wished to give a restrictive definition,
they knew how to do so unambiguously, as in their definition of trea-
son. 4 Thus, objectively read, Article II, § 4, does not define all im-
peachable offenses, but specifies those offenses for which removal is
mandatory.
B. Other Constitutional Provisions on Impeachment
The other provisions in the Constitution relating to impeachment
support the "imperative" rather than the "exhaustive" interpretation
of Article II, § 4. The impeachment power is granted to Congress in
Article I:
The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole Power of
Impeachment. 5
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.-
Here the word "impeachment" is used in a familiar context without
explanation or qualification. It is a time-honored canon of constitu-
tional construction that words so used are to be taken in their estab-
lished sense in 1787. 7 Impeachable offenses both in England and
America had included misconduct other than "high crimes and mis-
demeanors." s Thus if Article II, § 4, is to be taken, against the express
4. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3. Note the words "only" and "unless." Chief Justice Taney
commented upon the careful drafting of the Constitution: "[N]o word was unnecessarily
used, or needlessly added .... Every word appears to have been weighed with the
utmost deliberation, and its force and effect to have been fully understood." Holmes
v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 571 (1840).
5. Art. I, § 2.
6. Art. I, § 3. The powers are distributed in Congress as they had been in Parliament,
with the accusatory power (which had belonged to the House of Commons) given to the
House of Representatives, and the judging power (which had belonged to the House
of Lords) vested in the Senate.
7. In 1807, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote of another such phrase, "levying war":
It is scarcely conceivable that the term was not employed by the framers of our
constitution in the sense which had been affixed to it by those from whom we
borrowed it.
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 159 (No. 14,693) (C.C.D. Va. 1807). See Ex parte
Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925). Justice Frankfurter wrote: "Words of art bring
their art with them. They bear the meaning of their habitat .... " Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 537 (1947).
8. See pp. 1325-27 infra.
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force of its words, as an exhaustive listing of impeachable offenses,
it also represents a sharp break with earlier practice. Had the Framers
intended such a break, they could have accomplished it more clearly
than by commanding removal for high crimes and misdemeanors in
Article II after providing a general grant of the power to impeach
in Article I.
The proposed reading of Article II, § 4, is confirmed in yet another
clause on impeachment from Article I, § 3:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than
to removal from Office and disqualification to hold or enjoy an
Office of honor, Trust, or Profit under the United States.9
This limitation on the severity of judgments bears on the scope of
the impeachment power in several ways.
First, it confirms the drafters' ability to be explicit when departing
from English precedents. This provision of Article I prohibits the
more severe penalties allowed in England.' 0 Had the Framers also
wished to provide for a narrower range of impeachable offenses, they
could have put a similar limitation in the Article in which they granted
to Congress the powers of impeachment.
Second, the words "judgment ... shall not extend further than to
." plainly do allow judgments to extend less far than removal and
disqualification." This possibility of lesser judgments than removal
is reinforced both by history12 and by the terms of Article II, § 4.
Most recent commentators ignore the possibility of lesser penalties
than removal and read Article I, § 3, as though it read in effect: "The
only judgments in cases of impeachment shall be removal and dis-
qualification." 13 Not only is this reading a strain on the language,
9. (Emphasis added.)
10. As the Framers were well aware, see BERGER, supra note 1, at 4 n.21, 30 n.107,
87 n.160, 122 nA, 143 n.97, the English House of Lords had handed down a wide variety
of judgments in impeachment cases. Compare case of Henry Sacheverell, 15 STATE TRIALS
1, 39, 474 (Howell 1710) (temporary suspension from preaching) and case of Theophilus
Field, 2 STATE TRIALS 1087, 1118 (Howell 1620) (censure), with case of Lord Lovat, 18
STATE TRIALS 529, 838 (Howell 1746) (hanging, drawing and quartering).
11. It may be difficult in the case of fines and damages to determine whether or
not they are "lesser" judgments than removal and disqualification. 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES '140-41 [hereinafter cited as .BLACKSTONE] suggests that fines are lesser
penalties than forfeiture of office. In any event, there do exist judgments of the same
nature as removal and disqualification which clearly extend "less far," such as censure,
enjoining misconduct, or temporary suspension.
12. See note 10 supra; note 16 infra.
13. See, e.g., Hearings on Nixon Articles, supra note 1, at 5. But the following pro-
vision from Thomas Jefferson's 1783 draft of a proposed constitution for Virginia
demonstrates the capacity of at least one 18th century lawyer to express this idea un-
ambiguously: "[A]nd the only sentence they shall have authority to pass shall be that
of deprivation and future incapacity of office." THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA 416 (J.
Foley ed. 1967) (emphasis added).
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but it makes Article II, § 4, strangely redundant: were no lesser judg-
ment possible, the command to remove would be gratuitous. Converse-
ly, if it is argued that the command of Article II, § 4, bars judgments
less severe than removal in all cases, then Article I, § 3, which ap-
pears to countenance lesser judgments, is at best badly drafted and
at worst inconsistent. Given that removal and disqualification are the
outer limits of a range of judgments, it is extremely unlikely that
the Framers would have made Article II, § 4-which commands re-
moval14-the vehicle for defining the entire range of impeachable of-
fenses. The elimination of the more severe judgments is in fact more
consistent with a broadening than with a narrowing of the range of
impeachable offenses: 15 those impeached by the House of Represen-
tatives have ultimately less to fear from the possible partisanship or
irrationality of their judges (in the Senate) than did those Englishmen
who faced loss of life or liberty at the hands of the Lords.16
14. The fact that Article II, § 4, mandates only one of the extreme judgments ex-
pressly permitted in Article I, § 3, is an additional reason to see it as not containing
the entire scope of impeachment.
15. A similar point was made by Mason at the Constitutional Convention. See p. 1331
infra.
16. The theory presented in this Note-that the expression "high crimes and misde-
meanors" describes offenses requiring removal, but does not describe the full range of
impeachable offenses-is not new. The first impeachment under the Federal Constitu-
tion to result in a conviction was that of judge Pickering in 1803. In the Pickering
case-which was the only impeachment trial before 1936 to contain an actual holding of
guilt bearing on the range of impeachable offenses-the Senate not only rejected "high
crimes and misdemeanors" as a prerequisite to conviction, but appeared to acknowledge
the possibility of judgments less than removal. For an analysis of Pickering's conviction
for offenses other than "high crimes and misdemeanors," see note 92 infra. Having found
Pickering guilty by a vote of 19 to 7, the Senate passed a judgment of removal by a
separate vote of 20 to 6. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 367 (1803). If no lesser sanction than re-
moval were possible this second vote would have been unnecessary. But since Pickering
had not been convicted of "high crimes and misdemeanors," removal was not mandatory.
The "imperative" interpretation of Article II, § 4, is also substantiated by early com-
ment on impeachment. In the First Congress Rep. Boudinot of New Jersey indicated a
connection between the imperative character of Article II, § 4, "declaring absolutely
that he shall be removed," and the provision in Article I, § 3, allowing judgments less
severe than removal:
notwithstanding the clearest proof of guilt, the Senate might only impose some
trifling punishment, and retain him in office, if it were not for this declaration in
the constitution.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 486-87 (1789) (running head: "Gales &, Seaton's History of Debates in
Congress").
Early impeachment proceedings provide further support for the "imperative" interpre-
tation. Reps. Bayard and Harper, managers of the impeachment trial of Sen. William
Blount in 1799 (the first under the Federal Constitution), argued that the power to im-
peach is granted to Congress in its established sense and that Article II, § 4, merely
compels the removal of officers found guilty of the specified offenses. 8 ANNAxLS OF
CONG. 2251-53, 2298-99, 2301-04 (1799). Harper also insisted on the possibility of lesser
penalties than removal. Id. at 2302. These issues were not resolved because the Senate
disposed of the Blount case on the ground that a Senator is not subject to impeachment
for crimes committed while in office. See id. at 2318; BRANT, supra note 1, at 28, 45. The
constitutional boundaries were explored in another early impeachment trial, that of
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The prevailing interpretation of the Constitution also strains the
meaning of the provision for the tenure of judges, who hold office
"during good behaviour." 17 That provision serves to give judges life
tenure, and to indicate a standard for their removal. Article II, § 4,
applies by its terms to all civil officers, and there is no indication
anywhere in the Constitution that judges can be removed in any way
other than impeachment.'8 If the listing of impeachable offenses in
Article II, § 4, is indeed exhaustive, then judges' "good behaviour"
includes all conduct short of "high crimes and misdemeanors." But
there had never been any historical connection between judges' "mis-
behaviour" and "high crimes and misdemeanors."' 9 The problem of
reconciling judges' "good behaviour" with the offenses enumerated in
Article II, § 4, disappears once the latter provision is perceived as
requiring the removal of officers who have committed "high crimes
Justice Samuel Chase in 1805. Luther Martin, the leading counsel for the defense,
naturally adopted the "exhaustive" theory of Article II, § 4. 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 432
(1805) (Martin quotes the clause erroneously in making his argument). One of the man-
agers of the Chase trial, Rep. Rodney of Delaware, asserted the "imperative" theory,
stressing the common law background of impeachment, as well as the relation between
the possibility of lesser judgments and the mandate of Article II, § 4. Id. at 591-607.
The possibility of lesser sanctions than removal was again coupled with an "imperative"
reading of Article II, § 4, by Rep. Wickliffe, a manager in the impeachment trial of
Judge James Peck in 1831. See A. STANSBURY, TRIAL OF JAMES H. PEcK 308-10 (1833).
The managers of the impeachment of Andrew Johnson also acknowledged the validity
of the reading of Article II, § 4, proposed in this Note, but chose, doubtless to make
a stronger case, to characterize Johnson's violation of the Tenure of Office Act as a
"high" crime. CONG. GLOBE (SuPP.), 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 42 (1868).
A related aspect of the scope of impeachment came before the Senate in 1876, in
the trial of William Belknap, a Secretary of War, who had resigned before trial. Belknap,
who was necessarily being put in jeopardy of a sanction other than removal, protested
that the Senate had no jurisdiction over him since he was not at the time of trial a
civil officer. TRIAL OF WILLIAM BELKNAP 30 (Gov't Printing Off. 1876). Sen. Key of
Tennessee, among others, made an eloquent defense of the "imperative" reading of
Article II, § 4. Id. at 456-57. The Senate decided to take jurisdiction by a vote of 37
to 29. Id. at 239-40. This outcome would have been impossible if the scope of im-
peachment were strictly bounded by Article II, § 4, which is couched solely in terms
of removal of civil officers.
17. Art. III, § 1. A similar point may be made with respect to Article II, § 1. See
note 33 infra.
18. Deliberations at the Federal Convention suggest that judges are removable only
by impeachment. On August 27, 1787, the Convention rejected a motion to make the
judges removable "by the Executive on the application <by> the Senate and House
of Representatives." 2 FARRAND, supra note 3, at 428-29.
There is a remark by Gouverneur Morris which suggests, although not conclusively,
that impeachment trials were seen as the only alternative to the mode of removal which
had been rejected. Id. at 428. In addition to the debates at the Convention, Hamilton,
writing of federal judges, also insisted that impeachment is the only means available
for their removal. See THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 474 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961):
The precautions for their responsibility are comprised in the article respecting im-
peachments. They are liable to be impeached for malconduct by the House of Rep-
resentatives and tried by the Senate; and, if convicted, may be removed from office
and disqualified from holding any other. This is the only provision on the point
which is consistent with the necessary independence of the judicial character ....
19. See BraGER, supra note 1, at 122, 123-25, 131.
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and misdemeanors" but not excluding their impeachment and re-
moval for misbehavior.
20
In sum, a close reading of the Constitution reveals that the scope
of the impeachment power is not defined in that charter. And if Ar-
ticle I grants the power to impeach as that power was understood in
1787, then the range of impeachable offenses is illuminated, not by
those offenses for which removal is made mandatory in Article II,
but by the understanding of the impeachment power in England and
America during the period of the drafting of the Constitution in 1787.
II. High Crimes and Misdemeanors
Why does the Constitution require removal for the offenses speci-
fied in Article II, while leaving other wrongs to the discretion of Con-
gress and its historical perception of the impeachment power? The
answer lies in the significance of the word "high." Without the word
"high" attached to it, the expression "crimes and misdemeanors" is
nothing more than a description of public wrongs, offenses which are
cognizable in some court of criminal jurisdiction.21 A "high crime or
20. Misbehavior was among the many early standards proposed for the impeachment
of all civil officers. See p. 1334 infra.
In dealing with the problem of misconduct by judges, Congress has in essence ac-
cepted the theory of impeachment presented in this Note. In 1926, the House of Rep-
resentatives received the following report from the Judiciary Committee in connection
with impeachment proceedings against Judge George V. English:
[Tihe provision for impeachment in the Constitution applies not only to high crimes
and misdemeanors as those words were understood at common law but also acts
which are not defined as criminal and made subject to indictment, but also to those
which affect the public welfare. Thus an official may be impeached for offenses
of a political character and for gross betrayal of public interests. Also for abuses
or betrayal of trusts, for inexcusable neglect of duty, for the tyrannical abuse of
power ....
67 CONG. REC. 6283 (1926). The House went on to vote overwhelmingly for articles
of impeachment against English containing no allegations of "high crimes and mis-
demeanors." Id. at 6283-87. Cf. PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN TIlE
TRIAL OF IMPEACHMENT OF HAROLD LOUDERBACK 825-31 (Gov't Printing Off. 1933) (four
of five articles of impeachment did not mention "high crimes and misdemeanors"). The
most recent impeachment in which the accused was actually convicted by the Senate-
in some sense therefore the one with the greatest value as precedent-was the trial of
Judge Halsted Ritter in 1936. Ritter was impeached by the House "for misbehavior,
and for high crimes and misdemeanors." PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN
THE TRIAL OF IMPEACHMENT OF HALSTED L. RITTER 5 (Gov't Printing Off. 1936). He was
convicted on a general charge of misbehavior. Id. at 637.
English, Louderback, and Ritter were judges, and the Constitution makes jtdges' tenure
dependent on their "good behaviour." It could be argued that this sets apart judges-
and judges only-from the standards of Article II, § 4. But Article II, § 4, applies by
its very terms to all civil officers; if it limits the scope of impeachable offenses for one
officer, it does so for all.
21. Blackstone, speaking of the criminal law, begins: "We are now arrived at the
fourth and last branch of these commentaries, which treats of public wrongs or crimes
and misdemeanors." 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *1. He later continues: "T A crime,
or misdemeanor, is an act committed, or omitted, in violation of a public law, either
forbidding or commanding it." Id. at *5.
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misdemeanor" is not merely a serious crime, but rather one aimed at
the sovereign or his government, the highest powers of the state.22
"High" has denoted crimes against the state since the Middle Ages. 23
This meaning of "high" has become obscured for us by the passage
of time, but was clear to the lawyers of 1787. Part III of Coke's In-
stitutes-standard fare for lawyers of the 18th century2 4-begins with
a chapter on high treason, followed by a chapter on petit treason, the
first sentence of 'which demonstrates that for Coke "high" meant
"against the sovereign": "It was called high or grand treason in re-
spect of the royall majesty against whom it is committed, and com-
paratively it is called petit treason . . . in respect it is committed
against subjects and inferior persons .... ',2 Blackstone, who by 1787
was a towering authority on both sides of the Atlantic, 20 reasserts this
meaning of "high." 27 Even more revealing is that the 1787 Conven-
tion originally adopted the expression "high crimes and misdemeanors
against the State."'28 The words "against the State" were subsequently
22. The form of the expression "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misde-
meanors" in Article II, § 4, indicates that "treason" and "bribery" are "high" offenses.
23. This definition of "high" first appeared in impeachments in the proceedings
against Robert de Vere and Michael de la Pole in 1386: "[I]t was declared that in so
high a crime as is alleged in this appeal, which touches the person of the king, our
Lord, and the state of his entire realm .... " 3 ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM [Rolls of
Parliament] 236 (undated) (emphasis added) (passage from the rolls of Parliament for the
years 1387-88, transl. by the author from the original French: "[estoit declare], Que en si
haute crime come est pretendu en cest Appell, q [qui] touche la persone du Roi fire
[nostre] dit Sr [Seigneur], & l'estat de tout son Roialme .... "
24. See 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 376 (P. Ford ed. 1899); C. Vizas,
Law and Political Expression in the American Revolution, Feb. 1975 (unpublished paper
on file with Yale Law Journal) (thorough survey of Coke's stature in colonial America).
25. 3 E. CORE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; CONCERNING HIGH TREASON AND
OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN 19 (1817).
26. See, e.g., 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CoNsTrrTirriON 501 (1836) (remark by Madison regarding Blackstone) [here-
inafter cited as ELLIOT].
27. Blackstone continues Coke's classification of treason as "high" and "petit." 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note II, at *75. The definition of treason in U.S. CONT. art. III,
§ 3, is taken verbatim from Blackstone's definition of "high" treason, 4 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 11, at 081-82.
Bribery of a public official was also a crime against the state at common law, being
limited to the making or taking of payments to influence the course of justice. Id. at
"139. Blackstone describes various misprisions and contempts "immediately against the
king and government" as "all such high offences as are under the degree of capital."
Id. at *119. This confirms that an offense could be serious, i.e., "capital," without be-
ing "high." A distinction should also be made between "high" crimes and crimes "against
the King's peace," the latter words being a necessary incantation to bring any offense
within the jurisdiction of the King's courts. 1 id. at *118, *268, *350; 4 id. at *444
(appendix). Blackstone gives a long listing of "high misdemeanors," which includes some
maladministration, as well as other offenses against the government. 4 id. at *121-26.
For a view of "high" crimes by a historian in accord with the one given here, see Bestor,
Book Review, 49 WASH. L. REV. 255, 263-64 (1973). See generally BERGER, supra note 1,
at 61-62.
28. 2 FARRAND, supra note 3, at 550 (emphasis added).
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deleted from this clause, apparently because they were redundant.20
"High crimes and misdemeanors" thus refer to crimes which harm
the state in an immediate way and impair its functioning.3 0 Given
this meaning of "high," it is eminently reasonable for the Constitu-
tion, through Article II, § 4, to single out those offenders in office
whose conduct harms the state itself for mandatory removal, while
permitting Congress to impeach and remove those whose misconduct
strikes elsewhere.31 Indeed, it is difficult to treat the "high crimes
and misdemeanors" of Article II, § 4, as a comprehensive definition
of impeachable offenses. Unless the common law meaning of the phrase
"high crimes and misdemeanors" were abandoned, the currently pre-
vailing view that Article II defines the full scope of the impeachment
power would leave in office a President who had committed murder,
robbery, rape, blackmail-or for that matter who had conspired to
break into someone's office and deprive him of his civil rights.3- And
until the passage of the 25th Amendment in 1967, the "exhaustive"
view of Article II, § 4, would have left the nation without recourse
29. The words "against the State" were first replaced by "against the United States"
in order "to remove ambiguity." Id. at 551. The words "against the United States" were
removed without explanation by the Committee of Style. Id. at 575, 600. The Com-
mittee of Style was not authorized to make any changes in meaning. Id. at 553; cf. 3 id.
at 499. This allows the inference that the Framers considered the words "against the
United States" redundant in this clause. Rep. Lawrence of New York, speaking in the
First Congress, referred to Article II, § 4, of the Constitution as preventing the retention
in office of persons "guilty of crimes or misdemeanors against the Government." 1
ANNALS OF CoNG. 392-93 (1789) (running head: "Gales & Seaton's History of Debates in
Congress").
30. Examples of such offenses are: treason, bribery, obstruction of justice, sabotage,
and embezzling or stealing from the public treasury.
31. It is, of course, conceivable first to accept the idea that "high crimes and mis-
demeanors" define impeachable offenses, and then proceed to give broad content to
those words, in order that the impeachment power be a reasonable remedy against
wrong-doing. But the Framers did not see this constitutional provision as a grab-bag:
rather they perceived "high misdemeanors" as having a limited, technical meaning. See 2
FARRAND supra note 3, at 443. This meaning of "high misdemeanor" is very probably
the one found in Blackstone. See note 27 supra. Berger has difficulty reconciling the
narrow scope of "high" misdemeanors in Blackstone with the range of impeachable
offenses in English history. See BERCER, supra note 1, at 61-62, 86, 89, 92. Berger con-
cludes that "high crimes and misdemeanors" are words of art specifically describing im-
peachable offenses, and meaning something other than "crimes and misdemeanors" modi-
fied by "high." Berger, The President, Congress, and the Courts, 83 YALE L.J. 1111,
1145 (1974). Berger adds that "nor were ordinary 'misdemeanors' a criterion for im-
peachments." Id. These assertions are open to question. First, Berger's argument depends
on his assumption that the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors," and the term "mis-
demeanor" had different origins. Id. But this assumption may be inaccurate. See Roberts,
The Law of Impeachment in Stuart England: A Reply to Raoul Berger (to be published
in a forthcoming issue of the Yale Law Journal). Second, ordinary "misdemeanors" his-
torically were a criterion for impeachments. See notes 36, 39 infra.
32. Brant gives murder and rape as "manifest grounds of removal for high crimes."
BRANT, supra note 1, at 43. But murder and rape are directed at individuals, and were
not "high" at common law.
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against a President who proved dangerously incompetent, utterly lazy,
or even mad.
33
III. The Range of Impeachable Offenses
To say that impeachable offenses are not limited to "high crimes
and misdemeanors" is not to say what they are. The Framers adopted
the impeachment power against a well-known common law back-
ground of English and American practice. The contours of impeach-
ment were more familiar to the Framers than to us; indeed, there was
an impeachment actually under way in England at the time of the
Federal Convention.3" The delegates to the Convention undoubtedly
expected Congress to pay close heed to this historical background in
determining the scope of impeachable offenses.
A. History Before 1787
The history of impeachment before 1787 may not demonstrate the
wisdom of any particular impeachment or the fitness of any particular
impeachable offense, but it does help to reconstruct the general un-
derstanding of impeachment that an American lawyer might have
had in 1787. And the existing doctrine established that impeachment
was a developing common law process, an area of jurisdiction with
some power to shape itself, but also governed by precedent.
Although the numerous English impeachments hardly form a uni-
fied picture,35 both the cases and the writings of important commen-
tators reveal an impeachment power extending beyond "high crimes
and misdemeanors."30 There were, as one would expect, impeachments
33. To be sure, Article II, § 1, of the Constitution provides that in the case of the
President's "inability" his office shall devolve upon the Vice President. But nothing
there indicates that there is any mode of removal other than impeachment. The very
fact that the Constitution appears to countenance removal for "inability" strengthens
the "imperative" theory of Article II, § 4, presented in this Note. In the First Congress
Rep. Smith of South Carolina pointed out that the Constitution "contemplates infirmity
in the Chief Magistrate; makes him removable by impeachment; and provides the Vice
President to exercise the office, upon such a contingency taking place." 1 ANNALS OF
CoNG. 528 (1789) (running head: "Gales & Seaton's History of Debates in Congress"). Smith
was surely referring to Article II, § 1, and his construction of this clause is impossible
unless he believed that the scope of impeachment went beyond the terms of Article
II, § 4.
34. The impeachment of Warren Hastings. See p. 1331 infra.
35. See A. SIMPSON, A TREATISE ON FEDERAL IMPEACHMENTs 81-190 (1916); BERGER,
supra note I, at 67-73, 201-02.
36. Some commentators believe that "high crimes and misdemeanors" described the
whole range of impeachable offenses in England. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 1, at
67. One possible explanation for this view is that the phrase was routinely used in
the official language of impeachment proceedings-articles and pleadings-in the 17th
and 18th centuries. See A. SiMpsoN, supra note 35, at 143-90. But by then they had
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for treason and corruption. But there were others for misconduct un-
related to the performance of official duties and for various acts of
maladministration.3 7 In 1681, the House of Commons stated:
I
That it is the undoubted right of the Commons, in parliament
assembled, to impeach before the Lords in Parliament, any peer
or Commoner for treason or any other crime or misdemeanor.38
Blackstone, Wooddeson and Stephen confirm this view of the scope of
impeachment.39
become jurisdictional formalities, incantations like "by force and arms" in complaints
for trespass before the King's courts. See, e.g.. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 5 n.c (R. Kerr ed. 1962) (note by Edward Christian, a late 18th cen-
tury commentator): "When the words high crimes and misdemeanors are used in prose-
cutions for impeachment, the words high crimes have no definite signification, but are
used merely to give greater solemnity to the charge." See BERGER, supra note 1, at 59
& n.20.
Before 1660 impeachments had in fact been brought in England without alleging
"high crimes and misdemeanors," on charges of being a "monopolist" and a "patentee."
See Case of Giles Mompesson, 2 STATE TUALS 1119 (Howell 1620); Case of Francis
Michell, id. at 1131 (Howell 1621). There were also charges of "misdemeanors." See case
of Samuel Harsnet, id. at 1253 (Howell 1624) (ecclesiastical malfeasances). And there
were charges of "Misdemeanors, Misprisions, Offences, Crimes." Case of the Duke of
Buckingham, id. at 1267, 1308, 1310 (Howell 1626) (procuring offices for himself "to
the great discouragement of others" and letting the navy deteriorate under his com-
mand); Case of the Earl of Bristol, id. at 1267, 1281 (Howell 1626) ("Crimes, Offences,
and Contempts"). Some impeachments were brought on charges which were not defined.
A. SimnsoN, supra, at 115. Even after 1660, when the words "high crimes and misde-
meanors" were commonly added to articles of impeachment, the underlying charges
were frequently not "high." See note 37 infra.
37. Case of Lord Mordaunt, 6 STATE TRIALS 785, 790 (Howell 1660) (preventing
another from standing for Parliament, and making uncivil addresses to a young lady);
Case of Chief Justice Scroggs, 8 STATE TRIALS 163, 200 (Howell 1680) ("frequent and
notorious excesses and debaucheries"); 4 J. HATSELL, PRECEDENTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
HousE OF COMMONS 126 (1818) ("advising and assisting in the drawing and passing of
'A Proclamation Against Tumultuous Petitions' "); Case of Peter Pett, 6 STATE TRIALS
865, 866-88 (Howell 1668) (negligent preparation before an enemy invasion, losing a
ship through carelessness, and sending the wrong type of planks to serve as platforms
for cannon); Case of Edward Seymour, 8 STATE TRIALS 127, 128-36 (Howell 1680) (ap.
plying funds to public purposes other than those for which they had been appropriated).
38. Case of Edward Fitzharris, 8 STATE TRIALS 223, 236-37 (Howell 1681). The resolu-
tion was part of a dispute, never entirely settled, between the Commons and the Lords,
over which classes of people were subject to trial by the Lords upon impeachment.
See 2 R. WOODDEsoN, A SYSTEMATICAL VIEw OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 601 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as WOODDESON].
39. More precisely, Blackstone wrote that "a commoner cannot be impeached before
the lords for any capital offence, but only for high misdemeanors; a peer may be im-
peached for any crime." 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *259. Blackstone means (1)
that peers can be impeached for any crime, and (2) that commoners can be impeached
only for offenses which do not carry the death penalty ("misdemeanors"), and which
are "high." In other words, a commoner cannot be placed in jeopardy of his life in
an impeachment trial. This cleavage in English impeachments reflects the tradition
of not depriving individuals of their lives without a judgment of their "peers," and
has little bearing on the present discussion of the range of impeachable offenses. See
case of Edward Fitzharris, supra, at 231-32 & n.t. It should be noted that there is also
authority contrary to Blackstone's view as to the restrictions on the scope of impeach-
ment of commoners. Id. at 236 n.* (note by Howell); cf. 2 WOODDESON, supra note 38,
at 601 & n.m.
Wooddeson, who was Blackstone's successor to the Vinerian chair, and whose Laws
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In America, where the history of impeachment reaches back to the
17th century, "high crimes and misdemeanors" appear even less than
in England to have been the standard for impeachment.40 There are
definitions of impeachable offenses in the pre-1787 constitutions of
nine of the 13 original states and Vermont. None of them makes any
mention of "high crimes and misdemeanors," and all contain one of
the following formulations: "misbehaviour,"4' "maladministration,", 2
"maladministration or other means by which the safety of the State
shall be endangered,"4 3 "mal and corrupt conduct in .... office," 44 or
"misconduct and maladministration in ... office."4 5
The most difficult question with respect to the English precedents
is whether a crime in the modern sense was necessary to support an
impeachment. Impeachment was unquestionably a "criminal" proc-
ess.40 But that fact is only a starting point of analysis and does not
mean that an "impeachable" crime was a statutory crime, or an "in-
dictable" crime triable in the King's courts. The category of "crimes"
in the 18th century was broader than modern statutory offenses. It
included not only common law crimes which today would no longer
support a prosecution, but also offenses which were less clearly sep-
of England were widely quoted at American impeachment trials (see, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF
CONG. 2266, 2287, 2299 (1799)), clearly indicates that impeachment will lie for offenses
other than "high crimes and misdemeanors." 2 WOODDESON, supra note 38, at 601, 606,
612. James Fitzjames Stephen concludes that "peers may be tried for any offence, and
commoners for any offence not being treason or felony upon an accusation or impeach-
ment by the House of Commons, which is the grand jury of the whole nation." J.
STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 146 (1883) [hereinafter cited as
STEPHEN]. None of these writers anywhere proposes "high crimes and misdemeanors" as
the criterion for impeachment. Moreover, English law dictionaries from the 18th and
early 19th Centuries give "crimes and misdemeanors" rather than "high crimes and
misdemeanors" as the standard for impeachment. See, e.g., JAcoB's LAw DICTIONARY
(0. Ruffhead & J. Morgan eds. 1773). TOMLINs LAW DICTIONARY (T. Granger ed. 1836).
40. Article XVII of the Pennsylvania Charter of 1683 granted the Assembly the
power to impeach "criminals." 2 B. POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS:
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1529 (2d ed. 1878)
[hereinafter cited as POORE]. That power may have come to seem insufficient because
the Charter of 1696 included the power to "impeach criminals or such persons as they
shall think fit to be there impeached." Id. at 1535. In the interim, in 1684, the As-
sembly had impeached Nicholas Moore, the first Chief Justice of the Provincial Court.
The articles of impeachment, although formidable in appearance, contained allegations
no more serious than arbitrariness and arrogance. See W. LOYD, THE EARLY COURTS
OF PENNSYLVANIA 61 & n.l (1910).
41. N.J. CoNsr. art. XII (1776), reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 40, at 1312.
42. PA. CONST. § 22 (1776), reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 40, at 1545; VT. CONsr. ch.
II, § 20 (1777), 2 POORE 1863.
43. V&. CONST. (1776), reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 40, at 1912. See DEL. CONST.
art. XXIII (1776), 1 POORE 276-77; N.C. CONSr. art. XXIII (1776), 2 POORE 1413.
44. N.Y. CONsT. art. XXXIII (1777), reprinted in 2 POORE, supra note 40, at 1337;
S.C. CONST. art. XXIII (1778), 2 POORE 1624.
45. MASS. CONST. ch. I, § 2, art. VIII (1780), reprinted in 1 PooRE, supra note 40,
at 963; N.H. CONST. (1784), 2 POORE 1286.
46. Blackstone described impeachment as "a presentment to the most high and su-
preme court of criminal jurisdiction by the most solemn grand inquest of the whole
kingdom." 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *259.
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arated from "civil" wrongs than they now are.47 Moreover, the juris-
diction of Parliament as a court of impeachment was separate, and
was not bound by the precedents of the King's courts. Impeachable
offenses within the jurisdiction of Parliament were governed only by
the law of Parliament.48 Blackstone allowed that impeachable "crimes"
were something of a class apart:
For, though in general the union of the legislative and judicial
powers ought to be more carefully avoided, yet it may happen that
a subject entrusted with the administration of public affairs may
infringe the rights of the people, and be guilty of such crimes
as the ordinary magistrate either dares not or cannot punish.4,
The English practice was the starting point of impeachment in the
New World.50 American practice before 1787 seems on the whole to
have further separated impeachments from ordinary criminal juris-
prudence.51 Standards such as "misconduct in office," "malpractice,"
47. See id. at *216.
48. There is confirmation of this principle in Grantham v. Gordon, decided in
1719 by the Lords: "[I]mpeachments in Parliament differed from indictments, and might
be justified by the law and course of Parliament." 24 ENO. REP. 539, 541 (H.L. 1719).
This principle is echoed in 2 WOODDESON, supra note 38, at 605-06 and in ThE FED-
ERALIST No. 65, at 398 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) [hereinafter cited as Tnn
FEDERALIST No. 65]. In the Trial of Dr. Henry Sacheverell, tried in 1710, Parliament may
have decided (the record is somewhat unclear) that there need be no violation of es-
tablished criminal laws. 15 STATE TRIALS 1, 15 (Howell 1710).
49. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *260-61. This idea is repeated almost exactly by
Wooddeson. 2 WOODDESON, supra note 38, at 596. To be sure, Blackstone had previously
asserted that an impeachment was the "prosecution of the already known and established
law .... " 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *259. But Blackstone made this point in
order to distinguish impeachments from attainders. See id. And the "law" in question
is the "law and course of Parliament." See note 48 supra.
50. In his MANUAL OF I'ARLIAMENTARY PRACrICE V, vi, 112-17 (1857), Thomas Jefferson
gave the entire body of English rules as controlling in cases of impeachment. With
respect to the very question at issue in this Note, Jefferson read English practice broadly
to mean that the Lords "may proceed against the delinquent, of whatsoever degree, and
whatsoever be the nature of the offence." Id. at 113. Jefferson was repeating almost
verbatim J. SELDEN, OF THE JUDICATURE IN PARLIAMENTS 6 [1690] (published posthumously).
In 1774 some citizens of Massachusetts sought to defeat a new British policy of Paying
the colony's justices from the Royal Treasury rather than, as before, by appropriations of
the Massachusetts Assembly. When they consulted John Adams on how to overcome the
justices' refusal to renounce their new salaries, he answered that the Assembly could
impeach them, asserting that impeachment was a common law power inherent to all
parliamentary bodies: "Our House of Representatives have the same right to impeach
as the House of Commons has in England." 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADA,ts 238 (C.
Adams ed. 1856). There was no "impeachment" clause in the Massachusetts Charter of
1691. Adams was relying solely on a clause, I POORE, supra note 40, at 950, granting
to Americans the same rights as British subjects: "I repeated to them the clause of
the Charter, which I relied on, the constant practice in England, and the necessity
of such a power and practice in every free government." 10 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMTS,
supra, at 238 (emphasis added). Adams was also relying on Selden. Id. The Assembly
followed Adams' advice. Id. at 238-41.
51. See 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 324 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967). Hamilton con-
firms that impeachment was perceived as a separate area of jurisdiction, not governed
by precedents external to it:
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and "misbehaviour" were adopted5 2 and in some states the range of
penalties was limited to those of a more political nature.5 3 Therefore,
both English and American practice before 1787 indicate that although
impeachment was a criminal process, misconduct which would meet
this requirement of criminality was not limited to modern statutory
crimes.
B. The Drafting and Implementation of the Constitution
The impeachment power was widely discussed at the Federal Con-
vention. 54 Within a week of its convening, on June 2, 1787, the Con-
vention adopted the resolution of Hugh Williamson that the executive
be "removable on impeachment & conviction of mal-practice or ne-
glect of duty."' 5 On July 20, the Convention, after protracted debate,
adopted Williamson's clause for the draft which was sent to the Com-
mittee of Detail. 56 In the course of the debate, James Madison op-
posed Gouverneur Morris, who found Williamson's terms too broad:
Mr. Govr. Morris admits corruption & some few other offences
to be such as ought to be impeachable; but thought the cases
ought to be enumerated & defined:
Mr. <Madison>-thought it indispensable that some provision
should be made for defending the Community agst the incapacity,
negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate. The limitation of
the period of his service was not a sufficient security. He might
lose his capacity after his appointment. 1
Of the three grounds for impeachment mentioned by Madison, two-
incapacity and negligence-are not "high crimes and misdemeanors."
The necessity of a numerous court for the trial of impeachments is equally dictated
by the nature of the proceeding. This can never be tied down by such strict rules,
either in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors or in the construction
of it by the judges, as in common cases serve to limit the discretion of courts in
favor of personal security."
THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 48, at 398.
It is true that in one of the early American impeachments, that of Judge Hopkinson
of Pennsylvania in 1780 (who was acquitted of exacting illegal fees in a prize case),
the President and Council, before whom the case was tried, asserted that "crimes only
are causes of removal." PENNSYLVANIA S'rATE TRIALS 3, 56 (1780). However, this principle
was modified in early federal impeachments, such as that of Judge Pickering in 1804.
See p. 1334 infra.
52. See p. 1327 supra.
53. MASS. CONST. ch. I, § 2, art. VIII (1780), reprinted in 1 POORE, supra note 40, at
963; N.H. CONST. (1784); 2 POOR 1286; N.Y. CONST. art. XXXIII (1777), 2 POORE 1337.
54. Every plan of government put before the Convention contained an impeachment
provision. See 3 FARRIND, supra note 3, at 608; 1 id. at 22, 244, 292.
55. 1 id. at 78-79, 88.
56. 2 id. at 64-69, 97, 106.
57. Id. at 65.
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Later in the debate, Gouverneur Morris changed his mind, and came
around to Madison's view:
Mr. Govr. Morris's opinion had been changed by the arguments
used in the discussion .... Corrupting his electors, and incapacity
were other causes of impeachment. 8
In the hands of the Committee of Detail, Williamson's clause
changed from one in which the President is "removable" 59 for broadly
defined offenses to one in which he "shall be removed" for "Treason
(or) Bribery or Corruption."0 0 This clause was further modified by the
Committee of Eleven. The Senate was made the trier of impeachments,
and the only named offenses were treason and bribery:
(9) He shall be removed from his Office on impeachment by the
House of Representatives, and conviction by the Senate, for Trea-
son, or bribery.0 1
If this clause as it emerged from the two committees was intended
to describe the full range of the impeachment power, it was remark-
ably badly drafted. First, it addressed only the chief executive. Second,
if the new clause were to exhaust removable offenses, the members of
the two committees need onfy have replaced "malpractice and neglect
of duty" by "treason or bribery" in the original Williamson clause.
To have also replaced "to be removable" by "shall be removed" sug-
gests an additional intention. Were this additional intention both to
exhaust removable offenses and to make removal mandatory, the clause
would be inconsistent with other provisions in the Constitution.,2
And, although an inadvertent change is conceivable, it would have been
an extraordinary coincidence for the members of the two committees
to have unwittingly adopted the language of mandatory removal and
to have listed far graver offenses than before, without perceiving the
changed meaning of the clause before them. Third, we would have
to conclude that the two Committees wanted no impeachment provi-
58. Id. at 68-69. In the entire debate of July 20-which is the longest discussion
of impeachment which has come down to us from the Convention-"high crimes and
misdemeanors" were not mentioned. Id. at 64-69.
59. Id. at 132, 137 n.145.
60. The changes are reflected in the notes of a member of the Committee:
He shall be (dismissed) removed from his Office on Impeachment by the House of
Representatives, and Conviction in the Supreme (National) Court, of Treason (or)
Bribery or Corruption.
Id. at 172 (Farrand indicates that the parts in parentheses are crossed out in the original.
Id. at 163 n.17. The writing appears to be largely in the hand of James Wilson. Id.)
61. Id. at 481, 497, 499.
62. For an analysis of this point, see pp. 1318, 1319-21 supra.
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sion for offenses other than treason and bribery. Such a result would
be contrary to the earlier understanding of Madison and Morris, and
would leave an incompetent or insane President beyond the reach
of Congress, as well as one who had committed murder, highway rob-
bery, embezzlement, or drunken manslaughter. Rather than put this
strained construction on the clause that emerged from the Committee
of Eleven, it seems more plausible to take it to mean what it says:
if, on impeachment, the chief executive is found guilty of treason or
bribery, he must be removed.
The Committee of Eleven reported back to the Convention on Sep-
tember 4, and the "removal" clause 3 was put before the delegates
on September 8. Before coming to a vote, the clause elicited the fol-
lowing exchange between George Mason and James Madison:
The clause referring to the Senate, the trial of impeachments
agst. the President, for Treason & bribery, was taken up.
Col. Mason. Why is the provision restrained to Treason & bri-
bery only? Treason as defined in the Constitution will not reach
many great and dangerous offences. Hastings is not guilty of Trea-
son. Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be Treason as
above defined-As bills of attainder which have saved the British
Constitution are forbidden, it is the more necessary to extend:
the power of impeachments. He movd. to add after "bribery" "or
maladministration." Mr. Gerry seconded him-
Mr. Madison So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure
during pleasure of the Senate ....
Col. Mason withdrew "maladministration" 8 substitutes "other
high crimes & misdemeanors" <agst. the State.>
On the question thus altered [passed 8 to 3]. 64
Madison's remark about "the pleasure of the Senate" is consistent
with the assumption that he was talking about a clause governing
mandatory removal. If the "vague" term "maladministration" were
retained, and an impeachment were brought on any offense, the
63. Id. at 499, 550.
64. Id. at 550. Berger, Brant, and Black rely on this exchange for their conclusion
that the scope of impeachment is limited to "high crimes and misdemeanors." See
BERGER, supra note 1, at 74, 86; BRANT, supra note 1, at 18-19; BLACK, supra note 1,
at 27-31. But this conclusion does not necessarily follow. It is possible that Mason-
who was highly pro-impeachment and who had not been a member of either the Com-
mittee of Detail or the Committee of Eleven-had been expecting the former Williamson
clause addressing the offenses for which a President was "removable," was somewhat
surprised by a clause limited to treason and bribery, and had not perceived that it
addressed only mandatory removal. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 3, at 65, 106, 481; p. 1329
supra; p. 1330 supra. Madison, however, had been on the Committee of Eleven, and can
be presumed to have known the meaning of the clause before the Convention. 2 FARRANO,
supra note 3, at 473.
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Senate could rationalize a "capricious" removal by characterizing the
offense as maladministration and alleging a "duty" to remove the
President. The words subsequently proposed by Mason, "high crimes
and misdemeanors against the State," which have a more precise tech-
nical meaning, leave the Senate less room for such disingenuous
maneuvers. There is no need to distort the meaning of Article II,
§ 4, to give sense to Madison's words of September 8. It is certainly
possible for a term to be too vague for inclusion in a list of offenses
for which removal is required, while remaining a valid basis for the
Congress to exercise discretion.
Madison's very choice of words on September 8 confirms that what
he feared was the Senate's abusing a mandate to remove: he remarked
that "maladministration" in this clause would be equivalent to tenure
at the pleasure of the Senate. This is evidence that Madison perceived
the clause as concerned with a particular use of the removal power,
which is vested in the Senate alone, rather than with the full scope
of impeachment, in which the entire Congress has a part. Indeed, in
subsequent remarks on September 8, Madison indicated specifically
that the power of the House to impeach extended to "any act which
might be called a misdemesnor," a criterion much different from "high
crimes and misdemeanors against the State."' ' 5 Thus, although several
recent commentators 6 have concluded from the exchange of September
8 that the Convention rejected "maladministration" as a standard for
impeachment, it is more accurate to say that the Convention accepted
"high crimes and misdemeanors against the State" as a standard for
mandatory removal, after one delegate-Madison-had questioned "mal-
administration" for such a purpose.
One need only consider later assertions by Madison himself to con-
firm that the effect of Article II, § 4, is neither to confine impeach-
able offenses to "high crimes and misdemeanors" nor to reject "mal-
administration" as a ground for impeachment. Speaking before the
Virginia ratifying convention Madison suggested that "if the President
be connected in any suspicious manner, with any person, and there
be grounds to believe he will shelter them, the House of Represen-
tatives can impeach him; they can remove him if found guilty."' 7 He
later indicated that the President was impeachable for "abuse of
power." 68 On May 19, 1789, in the debates of the First Congress on
65. Id. at 551.
66. See BERcER, supra note 1, at 163; BRANT, supra note 1, at 21; BLAcK, supra note
1, at 29.
67. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 26, at 498.
68. Id. at 516.
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the Executive Departments (in which were intermingled numerous
comments on the scope of impeachment), Madison distinguished "high
crimes and misdemeanors against the United States" from impeach-
able offenses in general:
I think it absolutely necessary that the President should have
the power of removing from office; it will make him in a peculiar
manner, responsible for their conduct, and subject him to im-
peachment himself, if he suffers them to perpetrate with im-
punity high crimes or misdemeanors against the United States,
or neglects to superintend their conduct, so as to check their
excesses.0 9
Later in the same debate, on June 16, Madison asserted that the
President "is impeachable for any crime or misdemeanor before the
Senate, at all times."'70 Madison's most revealing remarks came on
June 17 when he suggested that the House could "at any time" im-
peach and the Senate convict an "unworthy man."7' Madison further
contended that "the wanton removal of meritorious officers" was an
act of "maladministration" which would subject a President "to im-
peachment and removal."72 There is no inconsistency between the
Madison-Mason exchange at the Federal Convention and Madison's
remarks on these later occasions. In the former, he was addressing a
clause governing mandatory removal; in the latter, the scope of the
power to impeach.
Other public comment and actual practice in the period immediately
following the drafting of the Constitution indicate that impeachment
was understood in the light of earlier English and American practice,
73
and that impeachable offenses were not generally seen as limited to
"high crimes and misdemeanors against the State." A theme which
runs through the state ratification debates is that impeachment serves
to make public officials "answerable" to the people. 74 Impeachable
69. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 387 (1789) (running head: "Gales & Seaton's History of De-
bates in Congress").
70. Id. at 480 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 517.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., 4 ELLIOT, supra note 26, at 44; 3 id. at 17.
74. See, e.g., 2 id. at 45. There were also remarks bearing on the scope of impeachment
made outside the ratifying conventions. Hamilton proposed a broad standard for im-
peachment: "The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the
misconduct of public men, or in other words, from the abuse or violation of some
public trust." THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 48, at 396. Hamilton does not even
mention "high crimes and misdemeanors" in the essays he devotes to the impeachment
power. Id. at 396-407. Luther Martin asserted before the Maryland Legislature that
the President is impeachable if "he is guilty of misconduct." 3 FARRAND, supra note 3,
at 158.
It must be conceded, however, that not all indications from the state ratifying con-
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conduct included: conduct exciting suspicion;75 "malconduct" and
abuse of power;76m aking bad treaties (James Vilson); 77 an attempt
by the President to push a treaty through the Senate without a quorum
being present (John Rutledge); 8 behaving amiss, or betraying public
trust (Charles Pinckney);79 "any misdemeanor in office" by the Presi-
dent, and giving false information to the Senate (James Iredell); s'
abuse of trust "in any manner" by the President (Richard Spaight); s'
"any maladministration in his office" by the President;" '-' and mis-
behavior (Governor Randolph of Virginia). s3 Moreover, in the debates
of the First CongTess on the Executive Departments, the standards pro-
posed for impeachment of the President included "maladministra-
tion,"84 "misdemeanors,"85 "malconduct,"'so misbehavior,-' 7 "displac-
ing a worthy and able man,"ss indolence, 8 and infirmity. ° John Vin-
ing of Delaware concluded that the people have the means of "calling
[the President] to account for neglect."9' Finally, in the trial of Judge
John Pickering in 1803, the Congress impeached and convicted a fed-
eral judge for drunkenness. The crucial feature of the Pickering case
is that the Senate appears to have consciously rejected "high crimes
and misdemeanors" as the necessary standard for impeachment and
removal.
9 2
ventions support the theory of this Note. See 4 ELLIOT, supra note 26, at 48-49 (remarks
by Maclaine and Gov. Johnston suggest "exhaustive" theory in the context of a debate
over whether Congress's impeachment power extended over state officials); id. at 113
(remarks by Iredell suggest "exhaustive" theory in the context of discussing limitations
on the President's power to pardon). See generally BLc.K, supra note 1, at 30, 49.
75. 2 ELLIOT, supra note 26, at 45.
76. Id. at 168-69.
77. Id. at 477; 4 id. at 125. See generally id. at 117-18.
78. 4 id. at 268.
79. Id. at 281.
80. Id. at 109, 127.
81. Id. at 114, 276.
82. Id. at 47; 3 id. at 17.
83. 3 id. at 201.
84. 1 ANNALS OF CoNc. 517 (1789) (running head: "Gales 8- Seaton's History of De-
bates in Congress").
85. Id. at 484, 493.
86. Id. at 495.
87. Id. at 493.
88. Id. at 504.
89. Id. at 489.
90. Id. at 528.
91. Id. at 594. Rep. Sedgwick of Massachusetts enumerated offenses which he con-
sidered impeachable for executive officers other than the President: insanity, loss of
capacity, incurable indolence, total neglect of duty. Id. at 478.
92. When the trial came down to a vote on Pickering's guilt, Sen. White, one of
Pickering's supporters, attempted to put the following question for judgment:
Is John Pickering, district judge of the district of New Hampshire, guilty of high
crimes and misdemeanors upon the charges contained in the article of in-
peachment, or not guilty?
13 ANNALS OF CONG. 364 (1803). Sen. Anderson proposed the following question:
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Conclusion
History reveals that impeachment is a judicial process. An impeach-
ment is an accusation followed by a trial, on which the Constitution
itself imposes safeguards of a judicial charactery In impeachment pro-
ceedings the representatives and senators do not have the unfettered
discretion of legislators; they are participants in a process largely gov-
erned by its own common law and history.9
Impeachment is also a criminal process. Impeachable offenses are
Is John Pickering, etc ... , guilty as charged in the article of impeach-
mient exhibited against him by the House of Representatives?
Anderson's formulation was adopted by the Senate, id., whereupon White made an
impassioned plea that to find guilt on such a question, without declaring "whether
those acts amounted to high crimes and misdemeanors," was to find that "high crimes
and misdemeanors" were not necessary for removal. Id. at 364-65. The Senate proceeded,
however, to find Pickering guilty in the exact terms of Anderson's question, by a vote
of 19 to 7. Id. at 367.
93. See Art. I, § 3 (senators on "oath or affirmation"; Chief Justice presides over
trial of President; two-thirds vote required for conviction).
94. The trial of Andrew Johnson in 1868 was governed more by political passion
than by the law of impeachment. See M. BENEDIcT, THE IMPEACHIMENT AND TRIAL OF
ADREW JOHNSON 1 (1973). The promoters of the Johnson impeachment particularly
departed from that law in denying the judicial aspect of impeachments. In his opening
address to the Senate, Rep. Butler, a manager of the trial, asserted that the Senate was
bound by no law, did not sit "as a court," and had "none of the attributes of a judicial
ComMt." CON. GLOBE (Surm'.), 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1868). The entire history of im-
peachment as well as every previous authority on the subject-from Selden to Hamilton-
belies this asertion. See J. SELDEN, sulpra note 50; THE FEDERALIsT No. 65, supra note 51.
Another aspect of the Johnson impeachment was the repeated argument hy the de-
fense that to convict Johnson on charges not sanctioned by Article II, § 4 (i.e., not
amounting to "indictable" high crimes or misdemeanors), was to make him the victim
of a bill of attainder in violation of the Constitution. Some recent commentators,
particularly Brant and Black, have taken up this argument and urge that the prohi-
bitions of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws imply a limitation of impeachable
offenses to well-defined "high crimes and misdemeanors." See BRANT, supra note I, at
133, 181-200; BL*cK, supra note 1, at 31-32. But the constitutional prohibition against
bills of attainder has little bearing on the range of impeachable offenses. A bill of at-
tainder was a legislative pronouncement imposing death or serious penalty without trial.
2 WOODDESON, supra note 38, at 621. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 277, 323
(1867); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441, 447 (1965); United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946). In the 18th century impeachment and attainder had been
perceived as entirely different. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *259; 2 WOODDEsON,
sujn note 38, at 621, 693-98; p. 1331 supra (remarks by Mason). Impeachment is, and has
always been, the exercise of a judicial power. See, e.g., I ANNALS OF CONG. 482 (1789)
(running head: "Gales & Seaton's History of Debates in Congress") (remarks of Rep.
Madison). Moreover, the abolition of attainders (along with the limitation on judgments
in Article I, § 3) argues if anything in favor of an expanded impeachment power, in
that it leaves the state fewer protections against the misconduct of individuals. See
p. 1331 supra (remarks of George Mason).
There is also no reason to see in the prohibition against ex post facto laws a limi-
tation on the range of impeachable offenses. A person tried under a common law
jurisliction is not the victim of a law arising "after the fact," despite the absence of
a statutory provision. There is, to be sure, an early Supreme Court decision, United
States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812), asserting that trial courts
of the United States cannot exercise common law jurisdiction in criminal cases. Id. at
33, 34. But Hudson specifically relies on the fact that the jurisdiction of federal trial
courts depends on the pronouncements of Congress, rather than being conferred directly
by the Constitution. Id. The impeachment power is not affected by Hudson, since it is
vested by the Constitution itself.
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common law offenses, not limited to statutory crimes. It is in the na-
ture of common law offenses to be somewhat fuzzy around the edges.
But all courts of criminal jurisdiction ultimately have the same pur-
pose-protection of the public. Impeachment lies for serious miscon-
duct against which the representatives and senators, acting respon-
sibly as grand jurors and judges, feel a duty to protect the nation.° 5
The fact that the Congress has used the impeachment weapon spar-
ingly-and usually for serious offenses-bears heavily on our standards
for impeachment. The fact that our structure of government is presi-
dential rather than parliamentary also speaks against promiscuous use
of the impeachment power. The only trial of a President in our history,
that of Andrew Johnson in 1868, came to be perceived as an aberrant
use of the impeachment power, and has had an important effect on
our law of impeachment. But it has had that effect because Congress
recognizes the Johnson trial as a precedent and chooses to proceed
cautiously against Presidents-not because impeachable offenses are
limited to those enumerated in Article II, § 4, of the Constitution.
It is not easy to gauge the effect of the theory of impeachment
presented in this Note. If one takes the boundaries of "high crimes
and misdemeanors" to be freely expandable to meet the necessities
of the moment, then the practical differences between the "impera-
tive" and "exhaustive" interpretations of Article II, § 4, are not over-
whelming. But if "high crimes and misdemeanors" are perceived as
describing crimes aimed directly at the state, the different consequences
of the two interpretations become apparent. A President who commit-
ted murder would be guilty of a crime against an individual, as spe-
cifically distinguished from a "high" crime at common law."o The
President's fate, and that of the nation, would depend on which theory
of impeachment were followed. Coming closer to home, let us assume
that in the case of President Nixon there had been a failure of proof
on all accusations against him except conspiring to break into the of-
fice of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. This crime-breaking and en-
tering, and possibly depriving another of civil rights-is directed at an
individual and is therefore not "high." If the "exhaustive" theory
had been strictly applied, there could have been no conviction. Under
the "imperative" theory the Senate could properly have convicted. But,
given that no "high" offense had been proven, the Senate would not
95. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 48, at 397; THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 407
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). See generally 4 BLACKSTONE, suprMa note 11, at 0259;
STEPHEN, supra note 39, at 146.
96. See p. 1323 supra.
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have had to remove the President, but instead, at its option, could
have censured him, enjoined further misconduct, or both.
Some may prefer that Congress have no such discretion, and that
impeachment be strictly limited to "high crimes and misdemeanors."
But individual preferences do not determine the meaning of the Con-
stitution. No theory of impeachment is without its hazards. The "im-
perative" theory works well only if the representatives and senators
perform responsibly as accusers and judges; the currently prevailing
"exhaustive" theory allows greater abuses by civil officers. But these
hazards are not equal, because no theory, including the "exhaustive,"
works unless the Congress acts responsibly. And the "exhaustive"
theory is less likely to deter a Congress bent on abuse than to restrict
a high-minded or timid Congress faced with official misconduct. The
reading of the Constitution presented in this Note recognizes in the
Congress a more flexible power to protect the public.
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